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1962/11/06

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Cuba / Bundy

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Control: 2016

Rec'd: November 6, 1962

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FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State

by destroyed 11/9/62

NO: 933, November 6, 1 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

EYES ONLY

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First half of 3-hour Tour d'Horizon with Hermes Lima Sunday November 4 was devoted to Cuba. Other parts talk reported separately with lower classification.

Hermes had received message from Campos indicating White House concern over General Albinos' mission, including President Kennedy's question about Albinos' political orientation. Hermes expressed great surprise in view our foreknowledge sending of mission and being kept informed subsequently.

I took opportunity deliver extensive lecture, polite but firm, on background Washington suspicions and concern many aspects GOB position Cuban crisis. Cited equivocal publicity here on meaning and backing of OAS vote, unexplained consultation visit of Pena Marinho, unfriendly public statement by Education Minister, petulant tone of Goulart letter of October 25 concerning OAS, some of Hermes' own statements implying GOB support for Castro regime as such, despite condemnation in Punta del Este resolution I. With specific reference to Albino mission, I said our idea had been quiet confrontation of Castro by Ambassador Bastian Pinto, who was already acquainted with him, in effort to explore Castro reaction to clear statement of dangers and disadvantages of Cuban ties with USSR and possibility of better alternatives for them. Instead, GOB had given maximum publicity to sending of special emissary, with newspaper stories about mediation of a type which could well add to Castro prestige and perhaps fortify his intransigence. I pointed out that GOB had shared with us strong support of idea of UN inspection, but had not yet publicly criticized Castro's refusal to accept it. I

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

STATE GUIDELINE, 6/7/76

By *[signature]* NARA, Date *10/2/80*

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-2- 933, November 6, 1 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO) from Rio de Janeiro

also had found boasting of Goulart and Albino about success of mission quite perplexing, only explainable as design to mislead Brazilian public opinion, since in fact mission seemed a failure.

Hermes listened patiently and rather uncomfortably, interrupting on occasion to rebut a specific point. Made half apology for Darcy Ribeiro statement on ground that it needed to defuse anti-American tension at University of Brasilia. (John Keppel tells me no such tension evident, unless created by Ribeiros' very statement.) On Cuban regime, said he was only defending right of Cuba to organize socialist society, and that he had once publicly condemned denial of civil liberties and other undemocratic Cuban practices. He still harbored illusion that US had sought sanctions at Punta del Este against socialist regime as such, and seemed surprised when I pointed out that anti-Cuban case turned entirely on links with Soviet Union and subversive activities in OARS.

Turning to future, I pointed to 3 continuing problems; A) Verification effective removal Soviet offensive weapons, B) Assurance of non re-establishment, perhaps underground; and C) Continuing problem Cuba based subversion in Latin America.

On A), Hermes expressed confidence Mikoyan would obtain Castro assent to some form international verification, if necessary paying price in additional Soviet economic commitments. On B), Hermes reverted to idea securing continuing international inspection in Cuba by associating with inspection other countries, either for control of non-invasion commitment or on wider basis for supervision denuclearization Latin America as whole. On C), Hermes said this essential part of points made by General Albino and he believed Castro must accept as only way of "preserving his revolution." Said he regarded Albino mission as only first step in continuing diplomatic effort which he hoped we would support. No indication, however, as to next steps contemplated.

GORDON

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